

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15

ACDA-10 IO-11 SAM-01 SAB-01 OMB-01 EUR-12 EB-07

TRSE-00 /110 W

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R 251412Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 349

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS, US

SUBJECT: ALLON KNESSET STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATING "TERMINATION OF  
THE STATE OF WAR" AGREEMENTS

1. IN REPLYING TO URGENT MOTION BY MK SHMUEL TAMIR  
OBJECTING TO FEBRUARY 22 CABINET DECISION TO EXPLORE  
PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENTS BASED ON "TERMINATION OF THE  
STATE OF WAR", FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON FEBRUARY 24 TOLD  
KNESSET A) DECISION IN NO WAY DETRACTED FROM GOI  
COMMITMENT TO SEEK OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENTS, B) GOI  
HAD NOT YET CONSIDERED TERRITORIAL SPECIFICS AND C) US  
AND ISRAEL WOULD SEEK CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT THE  
TERM MEANT BEFORE US APPROACHED ARAB STATES. (OFFICIAL  
TEXT OF ALLON STATEMENT STARTS PARA 3).

2. IN OPENING PRESENTATION, LIKUD MK TAMIR--WHO DEFINED  
HIMSELF AS A PERSON WHO WAS PREPARED FOR TERRITORIAL  
CONCESSIONS FOR TRUE PEACE--SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S  
DECISION HAD UNDERMINED "THE CORNERSTONE" OF ISRAELI  
FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1967--INSISTENCE ON FULL PEACE.

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"WHAT WILL WE HAVE LEFT TO GIVE FOR FULL PEACE IF WE

GIVE EVERYTHING AWAY FOR END OF WAR?", TAMIR ASKED.  
"THIS DECISION WILL COST US BOTH PEACE AND THE  
TERRITORIES". FOLLOWING SUCH WITHDRAWALS, TAMIR  
CONTINUED, THE ENEMY WOULD FORCE A WAR ON ISRAEL  
UNDER CRUEL CONDITIONS AND AT A TIMING CONVENIENT  
TO IT. THE CABINET'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOW  
SEEK A LEGAL OPINION REGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF  
"TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" WAS ABSURD. IN  
EFFECT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN POWER  
OF ATTORNEY AND ONLY AFTERWARDS EFFORTS ARE MADE TO  
CLARIFY ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

3. FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL GOI TEXT OF ALLON'S REPLY.  
BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION BY  
M.K. SHMUEL TAMIR DISTORTS THE INTENT, THE RESOLUTIONS  
AND ACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE  
A DURABLE PEACE WITH EACH OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

4. THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER  
NEIGHBORS AS A PRIME POLITICAL GOAL, AND CONSIDERS  
ITSELF DUTY-BOUND BY A HISTORIC, MORAL AND POLITICAL  
OBLIGATION TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL.  
PEACE HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED UNTIL NOW, NOT BECAUSE  
OF THE ABSENCE OF AN ISRAELI POLICY, BUT BECAUSE OF  
THE BARREN AND OBSTINATE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE ARAB  
GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE YEARS.

5. IN OUR INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, WE HAVE MADE IT  
CLEAR--IN PUBLIC AND IN NEGOTIATIONS HELD WITH  
VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE U.S.,  
AS WELL AS IN MY TALKS OF LAST SEPTEMBER WITH SOVIET  
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO,--THAT ISRAEL PROPOSES TO  
RECONVENE THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE IN ITS ORIGINAL  
COMPOSITION, IN ORDER TO HOLD PEACE TALKS AND DISCUSS  
HOW TO ACHIEVE PEACE ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AND THE U.N. SECRETARY-  
GENERAL' LETTER OF INVITATION OF 12/18/73.

6. THIS CONFERENCE HAS NOT BEEN RECONVENED UNTIL NOW  
ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DELAYING TACTICS ON THE PART OF  
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SOME ARAB COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY SYRIA, AND THE SOVIET  
UNION, WHO WISH TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON A CONFERENCE  
THE VERY EXISTENCE AND INFRA-STRUCTURE OF WHICH WERE,  
AND MUST REMAIN BASED ON GENERAL CONSENT.

7. IT IS EXPRESSLY STATED ALSO IN THE SEPARATION-OF-  
FORCES AGREEMENT WE SIGNED WITH SYRIA FOLLOWING THE  
YOM KIPPUR WAR, THAT "THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT A PEACE

PACT--BUT A STEP TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED  
ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 OF 10/22/73."  
SIMILAR PARAGRAPH WERE ALSO

INCLUDED IN THE TWO AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT. IT SHOULD ALSO BE RECALLED THAT RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 1973 CONTAINS, IN ITS SECOND PARAGRAPH, A REFERENCE TO RESOLUTION 242 OF NOVEMBER 1967.

8. SYRIAN OBSTINACY IS A REGRETTABLE FACT WE HAVE TO ACCEPT--BUT BY WHAT STRANGE TWIST OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY DOES THE SOVIET UNION ASSUME TO LAY DOWN POSITIONS AND TERMS, CONTRARY TO WHAT IS TO BE EXPECTED OF A CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. AS WE SEE IT, THE ADOPTION OF AN ARBITRARY STANCE BY A CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE DOES NOT FIT THE ROLE HE HAS TO PLAY.

9. MR. SPEAKER, AS ALREADY NOTED, ISRAEL WOULD PREFER TO NEGOTIATE A FINAL PEACE TREATY WITH EACH OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AND WE SHALL INSIST ON A SETTLEMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN, OF THAT PART OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WHICH DEMANDS A SOLUTION.

10. THE RESOLUTION, ADOPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE GOVERNMENT, TO AUTHORIZE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO REVIEW THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING "A TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" WITH EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA, DOES IN NO WAY CONTRADICT OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, ON THE CONTRARY, SHOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AT REASONABLE

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TERMS AN AGREEMENT ON "THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR", THIS WOULD REPRESENT AN ENORMOUS ADVANCE TOWARDS THE LONGED-FOR PEACE, REFERRING, AS IT DOES, TO A LEGAL-POLITICAL STATUS LEADING TO THE "TERMINATION OF WAR" LEGALLY, POLITICALLY AND FACTUALLY--A STATUS ONLY A STEP APART FROM ACTUAL PEACE AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. HOWEVER--IT IS TOO EARLY, FAR TOO EARLY TO VENTURE GUESSES ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF SUCH A MOVE. WE MUST CAREFULLY EXAMINE ITS ACTUAL PROSPECTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE, BUT EVEN SHOULD THE RESULT NOT MEASURE UP TO EXPECTATIONS, WE SHALL AT LEAST HAVE GIVEN A CHANCE TO A "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" WITH ALL THE MORAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE INHERENT IN THAT TERM.

11. WE HAVE FURTHERMORE EXPLAINED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT THE EXACT SIGNIFICANCE OF "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" MUST BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S., AND SUCH AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED BEFORE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DECIDES ON ITS OWN POSITION AND THE STAND TO ADOPT WITH ANY ARAB COUNTRY.

12. WE SHALL ONLY ADOPT THE OPERATIVE DECISION AFTER IT HAS BECOME EVIDENT THAT JERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON HAVE INDEED AGREED ON A COMMON DEFINITION, IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL SENSE, OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM 'TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR'.

13. AT THIS PARLIAMENTARY STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT

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SEES NO REASON TO CONVENE TO DISCUSS THE TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. IT IS SELF-UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS THAT MAY EVOLVE TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WILL HAVE ALSO TERRITORIAL SIGNIFICANCE. BUT ONE MUST NOT HARNESS THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE.

14. AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A FINAL PEACE PACT AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, A "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" OBVIOUSLY CALLS FOR LESSER TERRITORIAL PROMISES. THIS IS WHY M.K. TAMIR'S CLAIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT "HAS AUTHORIZED THE UNITED STATES TO NEGOTIATE EXAGERATED WITHDRAWALS ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF" IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED.

15. I SHALL BE ONLY TOO PLEASED IF WE SHALL REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR", IF THERE WILL BE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH WILL EXPRESS THEIR READINESS IN PRINCIPLE TO COME TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AND THE ROAD WILL BE CLEARED FOR PRACTICAL TALKS ON THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, TERRITORIAL AND DEFENCE CONTENT

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AND COMPONENTS OF AN AGREEMENT.

16. THE REVIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR THE "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR" IN NO WAY CONFLICTS WITH OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OF SEPTEMBER 1975. CLAUSES WRITTEN INTO THAT AGREEMENT ENSURE THAT ISRAEL WILL BE THE ONE TO INITIATE FURTHER MOVES AS SHE WILL SEE FIT. INCIDENTALLY, ALSO RESOLUTION 242 STATES, I.A., THAT ONE OF THE COMPONENTS OF AGREEMENT MUST BE THE TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF WAR. THIS POLICY ALSO CONFORMS TO THE BASIC GUIDELINES OF GOVERNMENT POLICY.

17. I SEE NO GROUNDS, IN THIS PRELIMINARY PHASE, TO ENTER INTO A THEORETICAL DEBATE OF LEGAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN "TERMINATION OF A STATE OF WAR" AND THE "END OF BELLIGERENCY". AT ANY RATE, WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING IS THE "TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR".  
END TEXT.

18. AFTER TAMIR AND ALLON STATEMENTS, LABOR ALIGNMENT AND LIKUD VOTED TO PASS THE MOTION TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.  
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## Message Attributes

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